The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new system of weighted votes in the Council, which radically departs from the principles on which the distribution of votes between the Member States of the EU was based for more than half a century. At the same time, the system of double majority is fundamentally different from the assumptions on which voting systems in federal states are based, including in the Bundesrat. Systems used in federal states are usually based on a compromise between the equality of states, and the equality of citizens. Consequently, in the Nice system, smaller Member States in the EU had relatively greater power compared to their populations than smaller federal units in the German Bundesrat. The results presented in this paper indicate that the Lisbon system of voting in the Council differs significantly from voting systems in federal states.
Introduction
Is the European Union evolving towards a federal system? Evidence speaking for the European Union being similar to a federation includes: EU institutions taking over competences previously held by states; the principle of supremacy of European law and its direct effect in national law; and cooperation between federal institutions and the constituent units in executing various tasks.
I What speaks against this thesis is: the lack of a European constitution; of the right to impose taxes; as well as the fact that states retain their membership in international organisations, such as the UN.
The EU's possible evolution towards a federation can also be examined from the perspective of changes in the voting system. We are interested in seeing whether the system of voting in the Council, introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, brings the EU system closer to a federal system, or indeed departs further from it. The 1 April 2017 marked the end of a transitional period in which states could request voting in the Council on the Nice weighted voting system. Because states had to consider that any member of the Council could demand a vote count in accordance with the Nice system, they assessed the chances of creating a blocking coalition for this particular weighting method. For most countries, the formation of a blocking coalition was much easier under the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Nice. The end of the transitional period, and the unconditional application of the Lisbon double majority system will change the balance of power in the Council.
The double majority system introduces solutions that significantly differ not only from the Nice weighted voting system in the Council, but also from the way in which the weight of votes of constituent states is usually established in federal states. A voting system in which the size of the population is reflected proportionally constitutes a departure from the experience of federal states. Of course, the European Union (EU) is not a federation, although some researchers identify certain similarities. The EU political system is not classically divided into the executive, legislative and judiciary branch. In particular, the Council and European Commission both perform executive and legislative functions (Conway 2011; Ziller 2008; Lenaerts 1991) . On the other hand, the role attributed to the Council of the EU is by some scholars seen as evolving towards that of a second chamber of parliament (Burgess 2000; Fabbrini 2012: 29) .
The first part of the paper will discuss the principles of decision-making in the Bundesrat. A simulation will show how the voting power of the various German constituent states, or Länder, would change if the Bundesrat were to employ a double majority system analogous to the one employed on the EU level. The second part will analyse the voting system that functioned in the European Union under the Nice system.
The third part will be dedicated to analysing the double majority system that has been used since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The article ends with conclusions.
The analysis is founded on the assumption that both the Bundesrat and the Council of the EU represent a two-tier decision-making system, in which the indirect power of each citizen's vote is equal to the product of the direct power of the citizen's vote in his/her voting constituency and the power of the vote of his/her representative in the council 
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independently of each other, and how they vote is only determined by the results of the polls in the individual constituencies (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: 65-68) .
The influence that each citizen has on the outcome of the voting process in the council will be equal when the power of the vote of a given constituency is proportional to the square root of its population (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: 63-78; Kirsch 2007; Penrose 1946) . The square-root system is based on the principle of representativity, which means that every citizen, regardless of which Member State he/she is from, has the same voting power. In academic literature this system is considered fair (Scientist for a Democratic Europe 2004; Baldwin and Widgrén 2004; Felsenthal and Machover, 2004; Plechanovová 2004 ).
It could be questioned whether the application of the square root of the population, in counting the indirect power of every citizen's vote in a council, is a proper solution. When there is a strong correlation of citizens' preferences in individual constituencies and at the same time clear polarisation in their preferences between constituencies, the method could lead to 'dictatorship' of the minority (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998: 71) .
We could therefore arrive at the conclusion that in a situation when the communities of various constituencies are homogeneous in terms of preference, with polarisation of preferences between communities, the voting power of the constituencies in the council should be proportional to their population. Consequently, a system in which the voting power of a given constituency in a council is proportional to its population can be deemed more appropriate because it reflects lasting differences in preferences between the individual constituencies. When the distribution of citizens between individual voting constituencies is random, as regards the views on the issues that could be decided on by the council, the voting power of their representatives in the joint decision-making body should be proportional to the square root of the population of these constituencies (Kirsch 2007: 357-380; Felsenthal and Machover 1998: 68-72) .
Both for the Bundesrat and the Council of the EU, it seems more justified to assume that there is no significant correlation of citizen preferences in individual constituencies (German constituent states, EU Member States) and to consider the square-root system.
One should agree with Kirsch (2007: 373) that designing a non-homogeneous voting system for a constitution or a treaty is not a simple task, even if we know the correlation structure of the countries in question. The correlation of preferences of citizens in E -179 particular constituencies varies depending on the issue being considered, and changes over time, while the constitutional voting system is generally expected to be applicable for a long time. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that there is no correlation between individual voters, even though it is an idealistic assumption. In order to determine the voting power of each player, we have used the Normalized Banzhaf Index (Banzhaf 1965).
The usefulness of voting power analyses has come under question from proponents of the non-cooperative approach. Albert (2003 Albert ( , 2004 denies the usefulness of voting games in the study of social and political realities because, in his view, they do not make it possible to gain empirical knowledge and, therefore, do not have any cognitive or prospective value. Garret and Tsebelis (1999a, b) criticise the application of power index approaches to the EU because they ignore the preferences of actors, the institutional rules that govern legislative processes, and the functioning of institutions other than the voting body which is the subject of an analysis. According to Barry (1980) , as a result of ignoring the preferences of actors in voting games, they do not measure power, but luck -understood as a chance of finding oneself in a situation in which most of the other co-decision makers will have the same or similar preferences.
The use of the Normalised Banzhaf Index in the present study is not intended to assess the ability of members of a given voting body to influence the outcome of a decisionmaking process; it may not be reduced exclusively to voting power, as Garret and Tsebelis (1999a, b) rightly point out. The Normalized Banzhaf Index was used as a tool for comparing voting rules. As a consequence, we model the voting system as an "abstract shell" (Linder 2008: 593) , ignoring all information apart from the voting rule itself inter alia the preferences of actors, other institutional rules in the legislative process, or political culture.
The voting system in the German Bundesrat
Germany is a federal state composed of 16 constituent states, the Länder. The 
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The members of the Bundesrat (69 in total) are delegated by the governments of the constituent states. The German constitution specifies the minimum and maximum number of votes that the Länder may have -from three for the least populous to six for the most populous. Resolutions are adopted by majority vote. Voting takes place in accordance with the guidelines provided by the governments of the individual Länder, and the position is agreed upon before the Bundesrat meeting. An imperative nature of the mandate requires that all delegates from a given constituent state vote the same, otherwise the vote of the entire delegation is considered void (Schmidt 2016: 285-293; Rudzio 2015: 288-289; Gunlicks 2013: 343-346) . This means that the vote of a state is indivisible.
The number of votes in the Bundesrat is therefore not directly proportional to the population. Democratic legitimacy does not stem from the direct equality of citizens guaranteed by the voting system. Less populous constituent states have a stronger vote than that which would arise from their population. The least populated ones have three votes, the middle-sized ones have four, except for one which has five, and the most populous ones have six votes. Bremen, which has 660 000 inhabitants, has three votes, as does Hamburg, which has two and a half times more inhabitants. Lower Saxony, with 8 million inhabitants, has six votes, the same number as North Rhine-Westphalia, which has more than two times as many inhabitants.
The table presented below (Table 1) shows the number of votes of each constituent state in the Bundesrat, the share of each constituent state in the total number of votes, the population, and the share in the total population.
We can clearly see that for the states that have six votes, the greater the population the greater the underestimation of the weight of their vote, calculated as the ratio of the share in total population to the share in the total number of votes. For example, for Lower Saxony the ratio is 1.11, and for North Rhine-Westphalia it is 2.5 (vote weight is 2.5 times lower than the share in total population). The opposite is true for the group of Länder that have three or four votes in the Bundesrat. There is a distinct regularity here that the lower the population the greater the overrepresentation of a Land in the number of weighted votes. For Bremen, it is more than five times greater than its share in total population. A more comprehensive analysis can be conducted using the Normalized Banzhaf Index (NBI), which illustrates the share of a given player (e.g. a constituent state) in the total number of swing votes of all states (Banzhaf 1965; Felsenthal and Machover 1998: 32-51) .
It shows the probability of a given constituent state becoming a pivotal player, in other words, of a situation when the decision whether a proposal will be passed or rejected by the Bundesrat will be entirely up to this state. A constituent state has a pivotal position when its withdrawal from the winning coalition means that the coalition is no longer winning because the sum of votes of its members is lower than the voting threshold.
To calculate the NBI, it is first necessary to identify the pivotal players in all the possible winning coalitions and then calculate the total number of situations for each player in which it would be the swing member of a coalition. The NBI for each player is determined as the ratio of its swings to the total number of swings. Table 2 presents a sample game with a voting threshold of q=6.The total number of swings of all players is five (a=3, b=1, c=1, respectively). As a result, the NBI takes the following values: a=0.6; b=0.2; c=0.2. 
The NBI indicates that the vote weighting system in the Bundesrat gives preferential treatment to the Länder with the lowest populations, and is disadvantageous to those with the largest populations. In the German system, voting power shifts from the three most populous constituent states, mainly to those with populations lower than 3 million, especially Saarland and Bremen. This is clearly visible in the values of the ratio of voting power to the square root of population. The ratio of voting power to population was calculated using the (ηS)/(Hs)formula (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: 166) , where:
η -the number of swings of a given player (country, Land) in a given voting system; H -the sum of swings of all players (countries, Länder); s -the square root of the player's population (countries, Länder);
S -the sum of square roots of the populations of all players (countries, Länder) in the council.
When the ratio equals 1, it means that the voting power of the Land is proportional to the square root of its population. When it is less than 1, then the voting power of the given
Land is smaller than its population would suggest. When it is greater than 1, the voting power is greater than the population of the Land would suggest. Thus, the ratio describes the disproportion between the player's voting power and its participation in the total population of all the constituent states. 
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As shown by the data presented in Table 3 , the voting power of the five most populous constituent states is underestimated to various extents, while the voting power of eleven states is overestimated compared to their population. The state that is most strongly affected by underestimation is the most populous one-North Rhine-Westphalia, and the one most strongly affected by overestimation is the least populous one -Bremen. Table 4 and in Graph 1. Unsurprisingly, in the situation in question there is a considerable shift of voting power to the three least populous Länder at the expense of all the others. In the case of North Rhine-Westphalia, the NBI value increased by more than 100 per cent. In the case of Thuringia, Saarland and Bremen, the NBI value fell by more than 30 per cent. The double majority system functioning in the European Union would probably be deemed unnatural and unjust in the German political system. 
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We shall begin the analysis of the European Union from the system referred to as the Nice system, which was functioning before the reform implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon. Given these prerequisites, the key goal was to achieve the threshold of weighted votes, as then it was rather unlikely that the other conditions would not be met. In this system, there are 5,032,111 possible winning coalitions. If only weighted votes were considered in decision-making, the number of winning coalitions would be 5,032,534. This means that among all the coalitions that meet the criterion of weighted votes, only 423 do not meet the majority of states and 62 per cent of the population requirement.
The Nice voting system

II
Calculations analogous to those performed for the Bundesrat can also be performed for the Nice voting system. In this system, the difference between the least and most populous countries is similar to that between the least and most populous German constituent states. The columns of Table 5 present this analysis showing the number of votes held by the individual countries, the share of each country in the total number of votes, the population and the share of each country in total population.
As we can see, in this case the underestimation of the voting power of Germany compared to its population is less than the underestimation of the voting power of North Rhine-Westphalia, and similar to that of Bavaria. However, the overestimation of the 
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which to a certain extent explains the slightly bigger range, we can conclude that the Bundesrat system and the Nice system are strikingly similar in terms of the privilege they give to inhabitants of smaller constituents, be it the German Länder or the EU Member States, in terms of voting power. Table 6 .
The Lisbon double majority voting system
Some researchers believe that in this system the vote of an inhabitant of a less populous country is stronger than a vote of an inhabitant of a more populous country (Neyer, 2010: 171) . In fact, however, the NBI and the share of individual EU Member
States in the total population are clearly different. This shows that the criterion of the majority of states in the double majority system influences the voting power of the players.
Compared to the Nice solution, this system gives preference to countries that base their voting power mainly on one of the two vote weighting criteria. As a result, the system favours countries with the largest populations, especially Germany, and the six countries with the lowest populations, at the expense of the other Member States. In the case of the four smallest states, increased formal voting power results from the need to achieve a 55 per cent majority of Member States to adopt a decision. The scale of the shift of formal vote power between the members of the Council following the replacement of the Nice system by the double majority system is presented in Graph 2.
Graph 2: change of the voting power of the members of the Council (measured in NBI) due to the replacement of the Nice system with the double majority system Source: Own calculations.
It should be stressed that we are using the category of inhabitants (or population), not citizens, because pursuant to current laws, the weighting method takes into account the 
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example, in Germany it is almost 9 per cent, in Spain more than 10 per cent, while in Poland it is only 0.27 per cent of the population. V As shown in Table 7 , the shift of formal voting power between the players -compared to its distribution proportionally to the square root of the population -is considerably greater in the Bundesrat system and double majority than in the Nice system. In the case of the Bundesrat, however, more than half of this shift is generated by underestimating the voting power of North Rhine-Westphalia, which has a much larger population than the other German constituent states. The Bundesrat system and the Nice system particularly underestimate the voting power of the most populous players, while in the double majority system there is a relatively large shift of power towards Germany as well as Malta and Luxembourg.
When applying the double majority system to decision-making in the Bundesrat, there is a considerable shift of voting power towards the two most populous Länder, resulting in an overestimation of the voting powers of their inhabitants.
However, the influence of the most populous EU Member States on the decisionmaking process is much greater than what would result from their formal voting power.
It happens very often that the stance of these countries, or at least the majority of them, is what determines the framework within which it is possible to reach an agreement.
In a vast majority of cases, decisions in the Council are made on the initiative of the European Commission -especially when they concern the adoption of legislation. Only in extremely rare cases does the 'Guardian of the Treaties' come up with an initiative that would not be backed by the majority of Member States. VI This means that in practice a blocking minority has to be developed on the basis of the criterion of population.
Member States' voting power in the Council affects their positions in three ways: (1) by having an impact on their ability to force the adoption of decisions, (2) by having an impact on their ability to block decisions and (3) by having their position taken into account to a greater extent in the process of selection and aggregation of interests at the drafting stage, provided that they do not take extreme positions. These mechanisms would also work on the level of the federal state, and in the case of the Bundesrat it would increase the ability of the Länder that have relatively large populations to enforce and block decisions.
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Under the double majority system, when a decision in the Council of the EU is made Berlin. In practice, therefore, it is rather unlikely that a blocking coalition comprising no more than 13 Member States would be formed, if it is to include only one of the six most populous Member States. At the same time, it is extremely rare for two of the six most populous Member States to be outvoted by qualified majority when proceeding on legislative acts.
Further differences can also be found in the ability of the individual countries to form a strict minimum blocking coalition VIII with a small number of members, as presented in Table 8 . coalitions that can be formed by a member of the Council, with between four and seven members, Germany is better off than the other Member States, including France, second in terms of population. On the other hand, for countries with populations equal to Austria or smaller, the ability to form blocking coalitions composed of four or five members is only illusory as it requires the support of at least two or three of the six most populous countries, especially Germany. In practice, for qualified majority voting in the Council, the situation in which three of the six most populous countries are outvoted never happens.
There are very rare cases when a decision is passed despite opposition from two of the six most populous Member States (Kleinowski 2012: 42-43) . This suggests that the influence of the most populous members of the Council on decision-making is greater than would result from their formal voting power, and that a joint position of the majority of these countries determines the framework in which it is possible to reach an agreement. When the European Commission proposes an initiative that is supported by the majority of the Member States, including 4-5 of those with the largest populations, it is rather unlikely that the decision will be blocked in the Council -provided that there is a need to achieve a qualified majority of votes.
Consistency
In order to answer the question about the consistency of the systems analysed, we shall calculate the diversity of distribution using the average absolute deviation of the ratios of voting power to the square root of population of the individual players from the value of this ratio equalling 1 (full proportionality). We shall use the following formula:
where:
x i -ratio of voting power to the square root of population of the individual player i N -the total number of the players
The greater the value of D, the greater the average absolute deviation of the ratio of voting power to the square root of population of all the players. This shows how big, on average, the disproportion is between the voting power of a representative of a community in a council, and the square root of the population of the inhabitants or citizens he/she represents, and thus indicates how much on average the voting power of an inhabitant or player (country, Land) deviates in absolute terms from the vote weighting system in which the voting power of all inhabitants is equal (when all the prerequisites listed at the beginning of the article are met). As we can see, the value of D for the Nice system is significantly lower than for the others, both including and excluding the 15 per cent. This means that the absolute deviation of the ratio of voting power to the square root of the population of all the players is smaller. In other words, the formal voting power of countries in the Nice system is more proportional to the square root of their population than it is in the Bundesrat system and the double majority system.
Conclusions
In the German model of federalism, the division of powers between the federal state and the Länder, and the existing institutional solutions, make it necessary to constantly seek consensus as otherwise it would be very difficult to pass legislation. The Bundesrat is the cornerstone of the cooperative model. At the same time, the way votes are weighted in this institution considerably boosts the role of smaller Länder in the decision-making process.
On the other hand, however, there is considerable risk of falling into the joint-decision trap (Scharpf 1988).
It could be argued that the European Union is clearly a much more complicated body than Germany, so some control is necessary to balance the influence of smaller member states. As a consequence, the increased efficiency of the decision-making process in the EU 
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was recognised as a priority in the Treaty of Lisbon, which resulted in the abandonment of the Nice voting system, and in a significant increase in the scope of cases where decisions in the Council are adopted by a qualified majority (Miller and Taylor, 2008: 79-85 ).
The double majority voting system in the Council, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, lowers the decision-making threshold and consequently makes it easier to form a winning coalition. The criterion of population favours large countries, giving them the power to block decisions they deem unfavourable; this even creates situations in which such decisions are simply impossible. In this system, smaller countries help larger ones to block decisions in exchange for specific benefits. Medium countries, in turn, find it difficult to form a blocking coalition without the support of large countries because of the small populations of the coalition's members. As a result, this could be moving the political system of the European Union away from the model of cooperative federalism. (2015) and Eurostat (2015) . VI An analysis of European Union legislative proposals withdrawn by the European Commission or rejected by the Member States between 2013 and 2015, which required achieving a qualified majority in the Council of the EU, shows that the annual number of such proposals can be estimated at between a few and a dozen or so cases, of which only some were opposed to by most of the Member States. Most cases when an initiative of the European Commission gave rise to opposition of a large number of Council members, concerned non-legislative proposals related to admitting genetically modified food to the market or the application of certain substances, especially in the food industry (Pollack & Shaffer, pp. 144-164; Kleinowski, 2012, pp. 33-34) . VII Treaty on European Union, Article 16(3); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 238(2). VIII A winning or blocking coalition is referred to as a strict minimum coalition when none among the subcoalitions have equal voting power, so they cannot ensure the adoption of a decision or block it, respectively. IX More on the definition of input and output legitimacy, cf. Easton (1965 ), Schmidt (2010 .
